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administration's alleged over-reliance on czars but also whether the staffing practice itself was constitutional (Vaughn and Villalobos 2012) .
Several years later, the furor over czars in the Obama White House has largely subsided, but the czar phenomenon itself remains cloaked in misunderstanding. In this article I attempt to resolve much of the uncertainty and unease surrounding the role policy czars have played and continue to play in the contemporary presidency. In doing so I first discuss what constitutes a czar. I then examine why czars have been controversial and, in light of that controversy, provide a theoretical explanation for why presidents continue to use them. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the key factors involved in successful czar policy leadership and how presidents can better utilize their czars, suggestions that can help enhance presidential success while minimizing public controversy.
Defining "Czar"
The term "czar" has been bandied about enough by politicos that it has become accepted shorthand for an influential administration official involved in a central policy area. For example, former George H.W. Bush deputy press secretary Alixe Glen notes a czar is "someone who can run it all. In a town like Washington that has so many fiefdoms and committees with long acronyms, calling someone simply a 'czar' gets the point across" (Trausch 1989 ). Obama Administration spokesman Tommy Vietor sounded a similar refrain as he sought to tame the aforementioned staffing controversy in the administration's early days: "The term 'czar' is largely a media creation to make jobs that have existed under multiple administrations sound more exciting. Every president since Nixon has hired smart and qualified people to coordinate between agencies and the White House" (Markman 2009) . This opinion appears to be shared across the ideological spectrum, as Gene Healy (2009) of the libertarian CATO Institute suggests that "… 'czar' is a media-coined, catchall term for presidential assistants tasked with coordinating policy on issues that cut across departmental lines" and Bradley Patterson (2009) -whose government service included stints in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford Administrationshas testified that "'czar' is not an official government title of anybody; it is a vernacular of executive branch public administration, harking back-in one account-at least to the Coolidge years. It is a label now used loosely hereabouts, especially by the media."
These examples reinforce the notion that "czar" is evocative of a vague administrative concept, yet the term still lacks a conceptual definition that is both precise and commonly accepted by political practitioners and pundits alike. Such uncertainty has led some to decry the meaninglessness of the term, such as law professor Aaron Saiger (2011 Saiger ( , 2582 , who has written, "In short, whether an official is called a 'czar' tells you as much about her formal organizational position as whether she works for a 'department,' 'agency,' or an 'administration,' which is to say, nothing."
Similarly, according to the Congressional Research Service, "For some, the term is being used to quickly convey an appointee's title (e.g., climate 'czar') in shorthand. For others, it is, perhaps, being used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White House or certain entities. When used in the political-science literature, the term generally refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an issue of great magnitude" (Schwemle et al. 2010, 1) .
In what stands as the most thorough examination of the legal challenges potentially posed by czars, Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell (2012, (Sollenberger and Rozell 2012, 51) .
Although critics voice concern over the unilateral roots of some offices that are said to be led by czars and others decry apparent violations of the non-delegation doctrine, the primary constitutional complaint concerns the Appointments Clause and the fact that some executive branch officials may have been inappropriately bestowed "substantial policymaking, regulatory or budgetary functions" (Rozell and Sollenberger 2012, 77 This case has been made elsewhere in painstaking and persuasive ways; however, it is not the only interpretation of the legal situation concerning czars. attempted to alter the legal status of certain executive branch officials identified by some as czars, primarily by either defunding them or demanding that all such personnel be answerable to legislative oversight. However, to date, legislators in opposition to executive branch czars have been unable to reverse or limit presidential appointment powers in such manner-save for one instance that had more to do with the fear of a government shutdown amid a debate over federal spending (Bravender 2011) . Even then,
the effort to pull funding ended with the positions being left vacant and relocated inside the Domestic Policy Council.
Why are Presidents Using Czars?
Considering the level of controversy czars can evoke, an observer of contemporary presidential politics can reasonably ask, why do presidents persist in using them to manage policy implementation and coordination? I argue that this institutional development is linked to the dynamics of presidential expectations and how presidents have sought to meet those expectations by exerting control over the federal bureaucracy through actions such as politicization and centralization. Noting that expectations far outstrip presidential performance capacity, Terry Moe (1985, 269) argued in a landmark essay that presidents have a strong incentive to adjust their administrative apparatus in such a way that maximizes their control over what John Hart (1995) has called "the presidential branch" and, thus, further enhances the effectiveness of their policy making process. As a result, presidents have embraced two distinct administrative strategies, centralization and politicization, both of which help generate the kind of opportunities presidents need. As administrative phenomena, centralization and politicization are complementary yet quite conceptually distinct (see Rudalevige and Lewis 2005 (Rudalevige 2002, 6) . In other words, by bringing government work previously done outside of the auspices of the Executive Office of the President, presidents centralize the work by bringing it within the fold of the presidential branch, with the goal of solidifying control over its operation.
To politicize, on the other hand, refers to staffing practices that prize political and ideological leadership over neutral competence, and frequently takes the form of either layering political appointees over career civil service positions already in existence or replacing career bureaucrats with loyal appointees (see Heclo 1975; Lewis 2005) . Just as centralization is consistent with a rational presidential approach to organizational management for the reasons discussed above, politicization marks an attempt by presidents to close the expectations gap by ensuring that the men and women working for them will have the president's preferences-or at least be more likely to have the same shared preferences-when making engaging in the governing process.
The end result of this centralization and politicization over time has been an expanded institution, increasing the amount of work the presidency was able to produce while simultaneously creating an ever-more complex managerial challenge for the president. Samuel Kernell (1999, 39) propose, and enact public policy. The conclusion here is one that suggests the president's problem, at least when it comes to the balance between management and policy leadership, is one of too much institutional growth resulting in sclerotic policy performance and effectiveness. A major factor in this disjunction has been the frequent absence of high-quality coordination. As the number of individuals and agencies evolve and expand in the presidential branch, it has become increasingly difficult for presidents to muster their administrative troops in efficient and productive ways.
Coordinating the Presidency: The Role of the Czars
As the president attempts to increase the White House's policy leadership efforts and to convert administrative entities outside of the chief executive's control into noted the scope of the task to be accomplished, saying that Bennett "has a big assignment-a big one. And a lot of it is coordinative (Bush 1989b) ." A month later, in a speech before the National Legislative Conference on the Independent Insurance Agents of America, Bush (1989c) repeated the sentiment as he noted, "When you look at the complexity of the Federal Government and the number of the agencies that are involved in this question of anti-narcotics, it is a massive executive, coordinative job." Later that fall, Bush (1989a) expanded on the specifics of the task:
One of the roles of the drug czar … is coordination. And we have had meetings around our Cabinet table to try to cope with bureaucratic competition that exists.
I can't tell you we've got it whipped. I can tell you we've made progress. But I think from a management standpoint the drug czar, with the full confidence of the President, offers the best hope to be able to have us minimize, if not eliminate, the rivalries that sometimes have adversely affected the concerted effort.
A similar emphasis on the coordinative purpose of czars has been made by every subsequent presidential administration. For example, in an April 1993 press conference, Well, the goal of the border czar is to help coordinate all the various agencies that fall under the Department of Homeland Security and-so that we are confident that the border patrols are working effectively with ICS, working effectively with our law enforcement agencies. So he's really a coordinator that can be responsible to Secretary Napolitano and, ultimately directly accountable to me.
Four Key Determinants of Czar Success
Czars may be accountable to their presidents, as Obama suggests above, but presidents have their own responsibilities when it comes to ensuring their czars are able to accomplish their assigned missions. Having discussed what czars are and why presidents use them, the question remains: how can presidents utilize these administrators in the most effective way possible? After all, presidents care about outcomes, and the nature of the administrative task that czars are handed is one fraught with complexity and obstacles to the extent that future presidents should consider how they can make their new czars more likely to succeed, rather than optimistically assuming success while attempting to sidestep failure and controversy. In doing so, presidents should consider four key determinants of czar success: clarity, expertise, analysis, and access. Each of these concepts is distinct, but also importantly intertwined. In other words, a president who makes sure to emphasize access and expertise but does not offer clarity or commitment will likely only marginally increase a new czar's chances for success.
Clarity
The first task for any president contemplating the establishment of a new coordinator within their administration is to first determine what precisely it is that they want this new official to do. Without clarity of purpose, any czar will spend their time spinning wheels rather than helping to solve the newly prioritized policy problem that Drugs, as enforcement-side policies and programs came to dominate treatment-based approaches to the national drug problem, which Jaffe was supposed to be leading.
In both cases, inexperience and lack of expertise led to perceptions of illegitimacy and hampered organizational performance, leading to abrupt ends to each individual's tenure as czar and undermining their respective administrations' abilities to solve the problems with which they were tasked.
Analysis
Once a czar has been selected and announced, it often proves difficult for them to Simon's experience was in direct contrast to that of the man he replaced as energy czar, former Colorado Governor John Love. Though Love was initially brought into the Nixon Administration to serve as a high-profile bureaucratic response to concerns about the national security consequences of the nation's growing reliance on foreign oil, he never truly gelled with the rest of the administration. His status as an outsider was only reinforced and exacerbated as he proceeded to give unpopular advice to the president. By the time Simon eclipsed him as Nixon's chief energy policy coordinator in 1973, Love's ability to get the president's attention was at its nadir, and with it his ability to influence meaningfully the administration's response to a wide range of energy-related problems.
Conclusion
As expectations for presidential leadership continue to grow and as complexity of legislation and the federal government continue to leave presidents in need of widespread coordinative assistance, policy czars represent one potentially useful albeit controversial and imperfect solution. With thoughtful dedication to structure and mission, along with a commitment to political transparency, future presidents may be able to utilize policy czars in a way that allows them to accomplish their managerial objectives while minimizing political challenges and perceptions of illegitimacy. Ultimately, for proponents and critics of czars alike, it is in the interest of every American to have a government that functions smoothly and effectively, rather than one where chances for policy success slip away into the cracks and cleavages between its branches and bifurcations. Until Congress takes action to either provide presidents with the level of coordinative support they need or restructure the government in a manner that reduces that need, policy czars represent an opportunity for presidents to meet the heroic expectations they face. 8 For an in-depth analysis of George W. Bush's use of various national security czars after September 11 th , 2001, including Intelligence Czar, Homeland Security Czar, and War Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos (forthcoming, chapter six) . 9 For an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Drug Czar, see Vaughn and Villalobos (forthcoming, chapter four) .
